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Nuclear weapons altered the relationship between the American state and its 
citizens in the early years of the Cold War. From the 1945 Trinity Test forward, 
Americans grappled with the consequences of the nuclear weapons revolution. 
Among other challenges facing the nation, it was clear that military defense 
against a nuclear strike was nearly impossible and civilian preparation programs 
could cost billions of dollars. Should deterrence peacekeeping fail, Americans 
would face an attack without military protection, making large-scale civilian 
casualties unavoidable. “And yet,” Senator Brien McMahon puzzled in 1950, “the 
first duty of a sovereignty is to protect its people.”1 Nuclear weapons unsettled 
Americans’ ideas about federal protection, individual responsibility, and public 
safety. Under the threat posed by nuclear technology, these conflicting concerns 
shaped domestic and international policy and framed national community in the 
Atomic Age. 
In my dissertation, The Atomic American: Citizenship in a Nuclear State, 1945-
1963, I argue that the changing possibilities of nuclear war provoked discussions 
about political responsibility throughout the United States, among policymakers 
and civilians alike. As Americans learned about nuclear technology, they raised 
fundamental questions about the role of the state. In a nuclearized world, who 
was responsible for the nation’s safety? What could the government and citizens 
expect from one another? The resulting conversations hinged upon what I call 
nuclear citizenship: the relationship between the citizen and the American state, 
constructed in an environment of rapidly-changing technology and the threat of 
nuclear war. 
The scale, severity, and unpredictability of a nuclear attack diminished the state’s 
capacity to assure the continuity of civilian life through active defense. Instead, 
policymakers established a system of passive—or civil—defense that placed the 
burden of survival on individuals. Political leaders urged citizens to seek 
information, training, and preparation supplies to protect themselves and the 
nation. In charging citizens with the task of self-help, the state framed survival as 
responsible citizenship. The ways Americans acted in the interest of survival, 
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however, were varied, complex, and often contradictory. Some citizens followed 
official civil defense suggestions, but many more developed alternative means for 
facilitating survival. These Americans saw their actions, even when they were at 
odds with state instructions, as expressions of patriotism and civic-mindedness. 
When examined as a whole, the diverse language of nuclear survival reveals a 
complex public conversation about the meaning of citizenship in the Atomic Age.  
Today, historical critics dismiss civil defense as a disingenuous government plot 
to calm panicked citizens, win support for diplomatic policy, or obscure nuclear 
dangers. This view exaggerates federal power and erases civilian agency. More 
importantly, it discounts the careful and concerned deliberations among 
scientists and policymakers, and ignores the many ways the public learned about 
and adapted to the nuclear threat. By placing nuclear knowledge in the context of 
civic activism, I argue that participation in civil defense—whether official or 
unofficial—was a political act. 
-- -- 
Debates over nuclear citizenship took place in a surprising variety of venues. In 
federal agencies, policymakers employed countless specialists, ranging from 
psychologists to engineers, to evaluate the feasibility and expected public 
reception of civil defense strategies. Official civil defense publications tightly 
managed the availability of official nuclear information, always with an eye 
toward protecting national security and preventing public panic. In state and 
municipal governments, civil defense directors defined nuclear citizenship in 
regional terms, adjusting federal recommendations to fit local demographics, 
budgets, and geographies. At the personal level, church congregations, parent-
teacher organizations, youth clubs, and other community groups prepared for 
nuclear war in the local civic sphere. Community forums provided individual 
Americans with opportunities to learn about nuclear technology, places to 
articulate their fears and concerns, and means to act in response. Using a 
language of civic duty, national pride, and democratic participation, Americans 
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staked a deep and personal claim in nuclear policies. Thus in the early years of 
the nuclear age, actors at all levels of government and society began to link 
citizenship, the state, and nuclear technology in ways that previous scholars have 
not considered. 
During the early Cold War, New York State emerged as an important site at 
which American citizens negotiated the complexities of the nuclear threat. As the 
home to New York City, a location overwhelmingly assumed to be a prime target 
in the event of war, Albany faced unique challenges to the federalist organization 
of civil defense funding. With the potential cost of protecting New York City so 
high, how would the state distribute civil defense expenditures? Over the course 
of the 1950s, it became more and more apparent to policymakers—in Albany, 
New York City, and in Washington—that the only feasible way to protect millions 
of Americans in the event of an attack was civil defense shelters. But by in large, 
states and the federal government could not afford to build shelters on a nation-
wide scale. Instead, officials told Americans, citizens would have to build, stock, 
and pay for these shelters themselves, an extension of the self-help civil defense 
ethos that policymakers had promoted since the early 1950s.  
However, the responsibility of building one’s own shelter fell heavier on some 
Americans than others. As nuclear weapons became more destructive over the 
course of the early Cold War, New Yorkers noted the disparity between rural, 
suburban, and urban spaces with horror. As one resident noted about a home in 
Jamaica, New York, only “a hardened, hermetically sealed shelter would serve the 
purpose” of protecting its inhabitants.2 In other words, such shelters would come 
at a much greater cost to urban residents; survival would be significantly more 
expensive to assure in the cities than outside of them. Moreover, building one’s 
own shelter required a significant financial output and the physical space to 
build, resources that were in short supply for many urban residents. Many New 
Yorkers thus noted the class disparity of self-help civil defense. Comparing inner 
cities with their wealthier suburbs, another resident asked, “are poor districts less 
worth ‘saving’?… What about New York City? Is it written off?”3 Because of the 
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relatively implausibility of saving the majority of New York City residents in the 
event of an attack, it is unsurprising that the City became one of the earliest sites 
of civil defense protest. However, the heated public discussion about urban 
residents’ access to survival in the Atomic Age eventually spread to cities and 
towns across the nation. By the early 1960s, protest against civil defense, and 
nuclear policy more broadly, became a national movement.  
By the end of the 1950s, New York State became a locus for discussion about civil 
defense for another reason as well: Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller was a vocal 
advocate of civil defense programs. During his first few years in office, 
Rockefeller built a fallout shelter in the Executive Mansion in Albany, went on 
state- and nation-wide promotional campaigns for civil defense, and fast-tracked 
a controversial $100,000,000 budget line to build fallout shelters in public 
schools. By the start of Rockefeller’s term in 1959, however, civil defense 
programs had fallen out of favor with several influential governors and members 
of Congress. By the early 1960s, Rockefeller had entered into a public feud with 
Governor Robert Meyner of New Jersey, who repeatedly called out Rockefeller 
and other civil defense proponents for “fostering a cruel deception on the 
American people” that underground shelters could provide a legitimate defense 
against a nuclear attack.4 Thus, Rockefeller became a household name among 
those in favor of civil defense and the growing number of Americans in 
opposition to it.  
Early in his governorship, Rockefeller also commissioned a series of reports on 
civil defense programs in New York State. 1959’s Special Task Force on 
Protection from Radioactive Fallout reexamined civil defense in the context of 
radioactive fallout, a relatively new consideration among civil defense officials.5 
The public had only been aware of the dangerousness of nuclear fallout since the 
mid-1950s, and by the end of the decade, scientists were still divided about its 
long-term effects on human health. But despite several years of heated public 
debate and public awareness of fallout as a separate danger of nuclear war, 
federal civil defense officials had not significantly altered safety 
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recommendations. Rockefeller’s Task Force represented one of the earliest 
wholesale reconsiderations of civil defense as a program to protect against fallout 
and not only the blast and fire destruction wrought by a nuclear attack (it was not 
until the late 1950s that the term fallout shelter supplanted bomb shelter in 
popular and official parlance). Thus, Rockefeller sent the Task Force’s 
publication, “Protection from Radioactive Fallout,” to governors and officials all 
over the nation and it became one of the crucial studies used by the federal 
government to reshape civil defense policies in the 1960s. 
As a result of his personal and political public safety campaigns, Governor 
Rockefeller received correspondence about civil defense from all over the 
country. Until 1961, when President Kennedy announced his plans to revitalize 
the national civil defense program, Rockefeller was the name most easily 
identified with the nation’s civil defense efforts. Americans wrote to Rockefeller 
to commend his programs; to offer their support, advice, and ideas; to send him 
news clippings from across the globe; and to request information or financial 
support for civil defense programs. Americans also wrote to Rockefeller with a 
variety of criticisms about civil defense programs. Many balked at the cost of civil 
defense, but others feared that civil defense programs only encouraged nuclear 
war, rather than working to prevent it. Rockefeller’s correspondence files from 
the first several years of his tenure as governor serve as a snapshot of the deeply 
polarized attitudes toward civil defense at the start of the 1960s. Much had 
changed since the early 1950s, when public attitudes toward civil defense policies 
were generally favorable.  
-- -- 
Broadly speaking, my dissertation reorients the historical understanding of the 
early nuclear age in the United States by using a broad lens to understand civil 
defense and public safety. Many studies of the domestic Cold War focus 
exclusively on state-produced information. Educational programs such as “Duck 
and Cover” dominate academic discussions at the expense of understanding how 
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Americans acted in response to the threat. In contrast, I use two categories of 
records to explore the dynamic relationship between citizens, the state, and 
nuclear technology. First, I use state- and federal-level civil defense agency 
records to explain how policymakers developed and maintained civil defense 
strategies and public information campaigns. Secondly, I use national civic group 
documents, local organizational records, personal correspondence, and popular 
media to show that civilians learned about, understood, and engaged with the 
changing nuclear threat outside of official civil defense channels. As such, I 
demonstrate that civil defense was simultaneously a grassroots phenomenon and 
a top-down federal project; a flexible cultural response that adapted to changing 
scientific awareness throughout the period; and a civic act that involved more 
Americans than previously assumed. 
I conducted research at the Rockefeller Archive Center (RAC) in February 2016, 
thanks to a generous grant-in-aid. The collections at the Center have helped me 
amass critical sources that illustrate both the top-down and bottom-up histories 
of civil defense. Records about civil defense, bomb shelters and fallout shelters, 
and nuclear policies are scattered through many collections and series at the 
RAC. The grant-in-aid provided me with adequate time to read closely and widely 
in a variety of collections, from which I was able to gain a broad understanding of 
how nuclear matters informed action, both within the state government and 
among average Americans. As I have completed my dissertation, these collections 
have added regional nuance to my nation-wide study while complementing the 
broader contours of civil defense history that I document as happening elsewhere 
in the country.  
In writing my dissertation, I drew most heavily from the Nelson A. Rockefeller 
Gubernatorial Subject Files films, which were a rich source of grassroots civilian 
voices like those mentioned above. However, several series within Rockefeller’s 
Gubernatorial Records were helpful to other aspects of my research as well. In 
particular, the Diane Van Wie and William J. Ronan series gave me a window 
into Governor Rockefeller’s official civil defense platform. These files held speech 
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transcripts, policy documents, official correspondence, and position papers that 
illustrated the decision-making process behind state- and national-level civil 
defense planning from 1959 onward. For example, Governor Rockefeller gave a 
series of seminars and interviews in the early years of his governorship. These 
transcripts and notes provide excellent examples of not only how Rockefeller 
promoted the need for civil defense, but also the kinds of civic groups that were 
interested in hosting him for such events.6 The Ronan series also includes a run 
of civil defense annual reports, which were of particular importance for 
illustrating how the Rockefeller administration’s policies translated into 
programs on the ground. 
Nelson Rockefeller’s interest in civil defense, however, predated his tenure as 
governor, and I found these records to be helpful examples even earlier in my 
dissertation’s chronology. In the mid-1950s Nelson Rockefeller served on several 
defense advisory committees under President Dwight D. Eisenhower that 
reconsidered the role of the federal civil defense programs within the 
organization of government. 7  I use such records to demonstrate that the 
Eisenhower administration continued to debate the functions of civil defense, 
even when public policy changes did not result from the discussions. 
Other members of the Rockefeller family also took an interest in earlier civil 
defense planning, as well. David Rockefeller was involved in New York City civil 
defense planning for a time, and several of the family’s charitable causes issued 
studies into nuclear protection.8 The Rockefellers also installed shelters at many 
of their family homes, and assured that their New York City offices had adequate 
civil defense plans.9 The records of the latter provide valuable examples of how 
large businesses approached civil defense planning independently of state 
agencies. Such corporate records are not typically found in public archives, and I 
was glad to have encountered this type of document at the RAC. 
-- -- 
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Nelson A. Rockefeller’s first years as New York’s governor overlap important 
years of change in the public’s perceptions of nuclear policies. By the end of the 
1950s, public health concerns and the fear of war had begun to merge with a 
growing cynicism that nuclear survival—whether via civil defense or other 
means—might be impossible. For an increasing number of Americans, then, the 
only sustainable means for survival was peace. But peace, of course, was a 
nebulous term. At times peace meant disarmament, the abolition of weapons of 
mass destruction, or a weapons test ban. At other times peace meant restoring 
diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union or ending proxy conflicts. In all of 
these scenarios, however, nuclear weapons—the teeth to the Cold War conflict—
were defined as the key problem. By the early 1960s, Americans increasingly 
expressed a vision of nuclear citizenship that renounced the nuclear entirely, 
calling for peace—not civil defense, nor deterrence—but peace as the antidote to 
the problem of survival in the Atomic Age.  
Governor Rockefeller was a staunch advocate for civil defense throughout his 
many years in Albany, despite currents of change in public opinion. But because 
Rockefeller’s civil defense policies encountered some degree of public pushback 
from the very start of his governorship, he served as a locus of public discussion. 
No other state-level leader was as widely associated with civil defense in this era 
both among supporters and opponents. As such, his personal and governing 
records offer a rare view into the connections between the federal government, a 
state official, and citizens. As Rockefeller’s constituents debated the merits of 
fallout shelters and survival guides, they engaged in a broader national 
conversation that connected their individual lives to the survival of the nation as 
a whole under the stresses of the Cold War. 
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